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Abstract
Recently, there has been renewed interest in so-called evidence-based policy making. Enticed by the grand promises of
Big Data, public officials seem increasingly inclined to experiment with more data-driven forms of governance. But while
the rise of Big Data and related consequences has been a major issue of concern across different disciplines, attempts to
develop a better understanding of the phenomenon’s historical foundations have been rare. This short commentary
addresses this gap by situating the current push for numerical evidence within a broader socio-political context,
demonstrating how the epistemological claims of Big Data science intersect with specific forms of trust, truth, and
objectivity. We conclude by arguing that regulators’ faith in numbers can be attributed to a distinct political culture, a
representative democracy undermined by pervasive public distrust and uncertainty.
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Over the past few years, there has been growing interest
in so-called ‘evidence-based policy making’. While the
concept is not new (Solesbury, 2002), the latest push for
more data-driven modes of governance has been con-
siderable (Haskins, 2014). Against the backdrop of
multiple crises, policymakers seem ever more inclined
to legitimize speciﬁc ways of action by referring to
‘hard’ scientiﬁc evidence suggesting that a particular
initiative will eventually yield the desired outcomes
(Urahn, 2015). Across many areas of public service—be
it healthcare, education, or law enforcement—a steady
inﬂux of ‘‘data for policy’’ (European Commission
(EC), 2015a) is meant to oﬀer guidance in a moment
marked by high levels of complexity and uncertainty
(Nowotny et al., 2001).
Legislators’ current emphasis on evidence and
results correlates with a recent techno-scientiﬁc devel-
opment—the advent of Big Data (Mayer-Scho¨nberger
and Cukier, 2013). While state bureaucracies have
relied on statistics and numerical information for cen-
turies (Cohen, 2005), new analytical techniques promise
to improve upon former methods in several ways:
Whereas data analysis has traditionally been costly
and time-consuming, it is now fast and cheap; whereas
previously one had to settle for samples, the ongoing
computerization of society makes it possible to glean
data from entire populations; whereas once there was
need for theory, through sheer volume the data now
speak for themselves; whereas in the past measurements
were tainted by human bias, agnostic algorithms now
guarantee an impartial view from nowhere. Together,
the alleged qualities of Big Data technologies feed
into what Rob Kitchin (2014a) has described as the
‘‘articulation of a new empiricism’’, which operates as
a ‘‘discursive rhetorical device’’ designed to promote
the utility and value of new analytical services.
Policymakers on either side of the Atlantic have
bought into the hype, usually without much regard
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for nuance or subtlety. In oﬃcial documents and
speeches, Big Data is referred to as the ‘‘new oil of the
digital age’’ (EC, 2012), the next ‘‘industrial revolution’’
(EC, 2014b), ‘‘gold’’ (EC, 2014a), a game-changing ‘‘key
asset’’ (EC, 2015b) for creating value, increasing prod-
uctivity, and boosting growth. The technology is not
only expected to improve public administration by
‘‘advanc[ing] government eﬃciency’’ (Executive Oﬃce
of the President (EOP), 2014) and enabling ‘‘better ser-
vices’’ (EC, 2013), but also to support ‘‘evidence-
informed decision making’’ (EC, 2015a) by providing
real-time feedback, generating solutions, and predicting
outcomes, always ensuring that ‘‘regulation is empiric-
ally justiﬁed in advance’’ (Sunstein, 2012). Although this
focus on technology-driven beneﬁts has in some cases
expanded to include consideration of potential risks
and pitfalls, political leaders remain ﬁrmly committed
to ‘‘harness[ing] the power of Big Data’’ (Kalil and
Zhao, 2013).
Much eﬀort has already gone into challenging the
buzz-laden assumptions of modern-day ‘‘data-ism’’
(Brooks, 2013). Investigating both the politics and
power of contemporary data practices, scholars fromdif-
ferent disciplinary backgrounds have identiﬁed a range
of social, ethical, and legal issues—from privacy and
security (Ohm, 2010) to transparency and accountability
(Pasquale, 2015), bias and discrimination (Barocas and
Selbst, 2015)—emphasizing that Big Data’s presumed
beneﬁts may come at a cost. But while there has been a
steady stream of critical reactions across academia and
themedia, attempts to gain a better understanding of the
socio-historical foundations of policymakers’ push for
numerical evidence have been rare. Put diﬀerently, even
though the rise of BigData and related consequences has
been a major issue of concern, its signiﬁcance for and
embeddedness in a long-standing culture of measure-
ment andquantiﬁcationhas not.AsBarnes (2013) poign-
antly states: ‘‘Big Data, little history.’’
One reason for this lack of historical contextualization
can be attributed to the dynamics of Big Data discourse:
Presented as a rupture and revolution with no ties to the
past, discussions about Big Data have focused on the
modalities of change rather than forms of continuity.
The ‘now’ is said to be fundamentally diﬀerent from
what came before, the ‘new’ supersedes the ‘old’. This
narrative of novelty and disruption, exempliﬁed in notions
such as Anderson’s (2009) ‘‘Petabyte Age’’, is both power-
ful and convenient, but discourages appreciation of Big
Data as a speciﬁc amalgamation, a ‘‘conjuncture of diﬀer-
ent elements, each with their own history, coming together
at this our present moment’’ (Barnes, 2013). Yet it is pre-
cisely the recognition of Big Data’s diverse roots, its con-
nection to prior epistemic practices, that may provide
greater insight into the current excitement’s underlying
norms and values.
Such exploratory analysis requires some conceptual
rethinking: Instead of narrowly deﬁning Big Data in
mere technical terms—e.g., Laney’s (2001) popular
‘three Vs’, which reductively characterize Big Data as
an increase in (data) volume, velocity, and variety—it
seems more productive to think of it as the termino-
logically contingent manifestation of a complex socio-
technical phenomenon that rests on an interplay of
technological, scientiﬁc, and cultural factors (cf. boyd
and Crawford, 2012). While the technological dimension
alludes to advances not only in hardware, software, but
also infrastructure and the scientiﬁc dimension com-
prises both mining techniques and analytical skills,
the cultural dimension refers to (a) the pervasive use
of ICTs in contemporary society and (b) the growing
signiﬁcance and authority of quantiﬁed information in
many areas of everyday life, including public adminis-
tration and decision making. Ultimately, this broader
interpretative approach may assist in ‘‘deconstructing
the black boxes of Big Data’’ (Pasquale, 2015) by
paying attention not only to the mechanical, but also
to the mental workings of an otherwise opaque
phenomenon.
Investigations into the roots and antecedents of Big
Data may take diﬀerent paths: Barnes and Wilson
(2014), for instance, examine the origins of the social
physics movement, whose monistic urge—that is, the
assumption that the laws of physics apply to both nat-
ural and social worlds—was later incorporated into
spatial analysis, shaping the use of Big Data in pre-
sent-day geography. Morozov (2014), drawing on
Medina’s (2011) Cybernetic Revolutionaries, details the
Allende administration’s Project Cybersyn to highlight
the intellectual aﬃnities between socialism, cybernetics,
and Big Data, while Grandin (2014), citing Dingens
(2005), reports on the Pinochet regime’s Condor data
bank to locate the ‘‘anti-socialist origins of Big Data’’,
a juxtaposition of historical events illustrating that the
idea of data-facilitated control may in fact appeal to
diﬀerent ends of the political spectrum. Last but not
least, Mackenzie (2013) provides an empirical account
of how recent shifts in programming practice relate to
what Adams et al. (2009) have labeled ‘‘regimes of
anticipation’’, demonstrating how the
current emphasis on machine learning and predictive
modelling is entangled with a concerted cultural eﬀort
to reduce uncertainty by fostering the continuous
assessment of the ‘not yet’.
While these examples oﬀer unique perspectives, each
focusing on particular cases and ideas, they are also
similar in that they seek to situate Big Data discourse
within a larger historical context, attributing meaning
to what all too often takes the form of pure marketing.
We suggest that such attempts to historicize and con-
textualize are crucial as they may (a) provide better
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insight into the epistemological foundations of contem-
porary data science, (b) deepen our understanding of
the norms, values, and expectations driving the current
climate of hope and hype, and (c) indicate potential
social and ethical ramiﬁcations, serving as a guiding
compass at a time when technical innovation continues
to outpace government regulation (Rubinstein, 2013).
We would like to contribute to this research agenda by
suggesting what may prove another fruitful avenue of
investigation: The data hype’s reliance on speciﬁc forms
of trust, truth, and objectivity.
As boyd and Crawford (2012) have argued, Big Data
is not just about technological progress, but about a
‘‘widespread belief that large data sets oﬀer a higher
form of intelligence and knowledge that can generate
insights that were previously impossible’’. Leonelli
(2014) makes a similar argument, stressing that the nov-
elty of Big Data science does not lie in the sheer quan-
tity of data involved, but in the ‘‘prominence and status
acquired by data as commodity and recognized
output.’’ But where does this prominence and status
come from and what exactly are the roots of the
belief that more data equals better insight?
An initial answer would be that data are often per-
ceived as raw, objective, and neutral—the ‘‘stuﬀ of
truth itself’’ (Gitelman, 2013). But, as historians of sci-
ence and technology have repeatedly shown, concep-
tions of objectivity, truth and truthfulness, trust and
trustworthiness may vary, they are ‘‘situated and his-
torically speciﬁc’’ (Gitelman, 2013). Therefore, it is
important to clarify which particular version of these
concepts manifests within Big Data discourse. One way
to identify such diﬀerences is through comparison,
which may involve tracing conceptual shifts and
changes over time.
In his book The Social History of Truth, Shapin
(1994) emphasizes the central role of trust in building
and maintaining social order. Societies are made
through acts of trust—without trust, they may falter
and collapse. The allocation of trust and trustworthi-
ness can thus be understood as the ‘‘great civility’’,
granting the conditions in which people can colonize
each others’ mind. Although often rendered invisible,
trust as the ‘‘cement of society’’ is also essential to the
construction and establishment of epistemic systems.
The production of scientiﬁc knowledge, for instance,
rests on myriads of social and material interactions,
which take for granted the reliability of numerous sta-
bilized norms and relationships. As a result, scientiﬁc
distrust and skepticism only takes place ‘‘on the mar-
gins of trusting systems.’’
But such systems of trust are not ﬁxed—conceptions
of whom to trust, what to trust, and in what circum-
stances, are subject to change: While in premodern soci-
ety it was the politically and economically independent
gentleman who was generally conceived as a credible
truth-teller, modern society accorded trust to the ‘‘abstract
capacities’’ (Giddens, 1990) of ‘‘faceless institutions’’
(Shapin, 1994). The veracity of testimony was no longer
underwritten by personal virtue, but by an elaborate
system of institutionalized norms and standards, rigor-
ously policed in a great ‘‘panopticon of truth’’ (Shapin,
1994). A diﬀerent form of trust ﬁrst accompanied and then
superseded the premoderns’ faith in the integrity of the
solitary knower and the moderns’ conﬁdence in the rigor
of institutionalized expertise, a type of trust that has
gained considerable traction with the arrival of Big
Data: people’s trust in numbers.
While the general history of quantiﬁcation can be
traced back much further, Desrosie`res (1998) identiﬁes
17th-century English political arithmetic as the ‘‘basic
act of all statistical work (in the modern sense of the
term), implying deﬁnite, identiﬁed, and stable unities.’’
Whereas early records of baptisms, marriages, and bur-
ials were meant to attest to the existence of individuals
and their family relations, later statistical surveys such as
the one underlying the 18th-century French ‘‘adunation’’
were intended to support the uniﬁcation of national
territory in order to establish a ‘‘politico-cognitive con-
struction of a space of common measurement’’.
Examples such as these highlight the close relationship
between statistics and state-making: Numbers allowed
for coherence and generality, enabling central govern-
ments to exercise administrative control over matters
of taxation and economic development at a time when
the familiarity of face-to-face interactions gradually gave
way to the anonymity and complexity of expanding
trade and business networks.
But behind those numbers still stood individual
experts and prestigious institutions—numbers did not
speak for themselves. Quite to the contrary, it was the
cultivated judgment of an administrative elite that
guaranteed the trustworthiness of numerical informa-
tion; deployed by outsiders, statistics counted for little.
As Porter (1995) explains, numbers could only ‘‘provide
a modest supplement to institutional power.’’ Their
credibility rested on the authority and integrity of a
bureaucracy whose members believed that measure-
ments only became useful when subject to expert inter-
pretation. For them, nothing could be reduced to
inﬂexible laws, abstract formulas, or technical routines.
Agreements were reached through informal discussion
rather than formal procedures. In general, decisions
were rarely entrusted to the numbers.
The demand for quantitative rigor increased during
the ﬁrst half of the 20th century: Instead of expert judg-
ment, the pursuit of technical discipline required an
‘‘ideal of self-sacriﬁce’’; instead of professional auton-
omy, the desire for precision imposed adherence to a
strict ‘‘regime of calculation’’; instead of elite
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discretion, it became necessary to ‘‘manage by the num-
bers’’ (Porter, 1995). The result was what Porter refers to
as the ‘‘cult of impersonality’’, a speciﬁc culture of quan-
tiﬁcation that seeks to reduce the human element as
much as possible, preferring formalized principles to
subjective interpretation, uniform standards to meth-
odological tinkering, the rule of law to the rule of
men. The goal was to attain ‘‘mechanical objectivity’’
(Daston and Galison, 1992), a disinterested science
that ‘‘eradicates all that is personal, idiosyncratic, per-
spectival.’’ In this brave new world, trust no longer res-
ides in the integrity of individual truth-tellers or the
veracity of prestigious institutions, but is placed in
highly formalized procedures enacted through disci-
plined self-restraint. Numbers cease to be supplements.
They are couched in a rhetoric of factuality, imbued with
an ethos of neutrality, and presented with an aura of
certainty. They step out of the shadows of their human
creators, enter center stage, and, in the arguments and
claims of countless proﬁteers, start to speak for
themselves.
What are the reasons for this shift toward mechanical
objectivity? On the one hand, technological progress
played a signiﬁcant role. The growing availability of
ever more capable machinery changed the face of the
accounting profession. The idea was powerful: The
more mechanized a process, the more automated a pro-
cedure, the less the need for—and danger of—subjective
human intervention (Venturini et al., 2014). In the words
of Daston and Galison (2010), ‘‘instead of freedom of
will, machines oﬀered freedom from will’’. The virtuous
machine was conceived as the ‘‘ultimate outsider’’, and it
was not long until ‘‘it became the greatest in the king-
dom of quantiﬁcation’’ (Porter, 1995). Consequently, the
‘‘honest instrument’’ with its ‘‘glow of veracity’’ both
served as a means to and symbol of mechanical object-
ivity (Daston and Galison, 1992, 2010).
On the other hand, there was a social dimension:
The pursuit of quantitative rigor was seen as a strategy
to adapt to new external pressures in a rapidly changing
political environment. War and economic crisis had left
their marks, and the dynamics of democracy increased
the need for hard evidence and professional account-
ability. Confronted with public distrust, invasive audit-
ing, and competing political demands, bureaucratic
agencies and scientiﬁc communities sought to withstand
scrutiny and minimize responsibility by adhering to
rigid protocols and explicit decision criteria. This will-
ingness for personal restraint is a sign of professional
weakness rather than strength: The more permeable the
boundaries of a discipline, the higher its vulnerability to
outside criticism, the more tempting the language of
mechanical objectivity becomes. Consequently, the
appeal of standardized methods is especially great in
cultures where the faith in other forms of trust has
been shattered. As Porter (1995) notes, methodological
strictness and objective rules may serve as an alternative
to trust and shared beliefs. Where trust is missing and
suspicion prevails, numbers are meant to ﬁll the gap:
Regarded as carefully measured matters of fact, they
are expected to oﬀer a sense of fairness and justice,
a way of making decisions without having to decide, a
chance to de-politicize legislation. This push for imper-
sonal numerical evidence is however not so much rooted
in the inner workings of quantitative professions, but in
the needs and demands of a speciﬁc socio-political cul-
ture, a democratic system undermined by pervasive dis-
trust and uncertainty. It is on these grounds that the Big
Data phenomenon continues to blossom.
The epistemic promises of Big Data connect to the
ideal of mechanical objectivity in several ways, not only
fortifying but also expanding the appeal of the doctrine:
First, a child of new analytical techniques and the
progressing computerization of society, Big Data
pledges to extend the reach of automation, from data
collection to matters of storage, curation, and analysis.
The virtuous machine emerges as ever more powerful as
it covers increasingly large parts of the analytical and
decision-making process.
Second, by capturing massive amounts of data and
focusing on correlations rather than causes, Big Data
claims to reduce the need for theory, models, and, in
extension, human expertise. In addition, modern data
analysis software is often thoroughly opaque, with a
phenomenology that emphasizes both uniformity and
impersonality.
Third, Big Data promises to expand the realm of
what can be measured. Trackers, social media, and
the Internet of Things allow to trace and gauge move-
ments, actions, and behaviors in ways that were previ-
ously unfeasible. Fully quantiﬁed and free from bias,
Big Data pushes the tenets of mechanical objectivity
into ever more areas of application.
Fourth and ﬁnally, settling for neither the present
nor the past, Big Data aspires to calculate what is yet
to come. Smart, fast, and cheap predictive techniques
are meant to support decision making and optimize
resource allocation across many government sectors,
applying a mechanical mindset to the colonization of
the future.
The limitations of these ‘‘sociotechnical imaginaries’’
(Jasanoﬀ and Kim, 2009) have been discussed elsewhere
(e.g., Kitchin, 2014b), but the point here is to develop a
better understanding of how the current language of Big
Data-related hope and hype intersects with and relies on
particular forms of trust and objectivity, which, in turn,
can be conceived as products of a speciﬁc socio-political
culture. In a climate of distrust, crisis, and uncertainty,
oﬃcials’ adherence to supposedly impartial numbers
may be regarded as a strategy of defense, an attempt
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to shield themselves from increased public and judicial
scrutiny. It is not by coincidence that the European
Commission, whose authority continues to be challenged
by citizens and national governments alike, has emerged
as one of the most zealous political quantiﬁers.
Big Data has been repeatedly criticized for its positiv-
ist epistemology and its support of techno-capitalism,
and while such criticism has its merits, it pays little atten-
tion to the circumstances and dynamics that contribute
to the creation and internalization of corresponding
norms and values. Our proposition is simple: Instead of
focusing exclusively on the potential consequences of the
Big Data phenomenon, we can gain additional insight
from examining its social and political, but also its tech-
nical and epistemic roots. Such an approach may foster
more, not less, critical engagement as it shifts the perspec-
tive and situates Big Data discourse within a broader
historical narrative. As Barnes andWilson (2014) argue:
By showing that Big Data is historical, we show the
assumptions that were built into it, as well as the con-
testations around them. Big Data becomes no longer a
black box, self-contained, sealed and impregnable, but
is opened up, available for verbalist discussion and
contestation.
We wholeheartedly agree.
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